In the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem we are given an election, a preferred candidate, and the costs of shifting this preferred candidate up the voters' preference orders. The goal is to find such a set of shifts that ensures that the preferred candidate wins the election. We give the first polynomial-time approximation scheme for the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem for the case of positional scoring rules, and for the Copeland rule we show strong inapproximability results.
Introduction
We provide approximation algorithms and inapproximability results for the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem, introduced by Elkind et al. [EFS09] to capture the idea of campaigning in elections. Briefly put, we are given an election where each voter ranks the candidates from the most to the least appealing one, and our goal is to ensure that a given preferred candidate becomes the winner. To this end, we can shift this candidate up within the voters' preference orders, but each such shift comes with a price (which, for example, measures the difficulty of convincing the voter that our candidate is more appealing than the voter originally thought). Naturally, we are interested in finding as cheap a solution as possible.
While the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem was introduced in the context of buying votes and in the context of campaigning, bribery problems have a number of other applications (see, e.g., the works on the margin of victory problem [MRS11, Car11, Xia12] and on measuring candidate success [FST17] ; see also the original paper of Faliszewski et al. [FHH09] and the survey of Faliszewski and Rothe [FR16] ). For example, a Formula 1 season consists of about 20 races, where each race can be seen as a voter ranking the candidates (the drivers) in the order in which they finished the race. For each finishing position, there is an associated number of points and the driver who collects most points becomes the world champion (i.e., this "election" uses a positional scoring rule as a voting rule). We can use the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem to measure how close each driver was to winning the world championship. For example, we can set the price for shifting a driver up by some t positions in a given race to be the difference between the finishing times of the driver and whoever ranked t positions higher. Then, the cheapest shift bribery corresponds to the smallest speed-up that the driver needed to become the world champion. As argued by Faliszewski et al. [FST17] , such values can be far more informative than the score differences between the drivers. Bribery problems also appear in the contexts of lobbying [BEF + 07, BEF + 14], rating systems [GST18] , or in combinatorial domains [BEER15] .
With the exception of a few simple voting rules, such as the k-Approval family of rules and the Bucklin rule, SHIFT-BRIBERY tends to be NP-hard (see the works of Elkind et al. [EFS09] and Schlotter et al. [SFE17] ). Indeed, this is the case, e.g., for Borda, Copeland, Maximin [EFS09] and various elimination-based rules [MNRS18] . Yet, in many cases it can be solved quite effectively. For example, for the case of Borda there is a polynomial-time 2-approximation algorithm of Elkind et al. [EFS09, EF10] 1 and the best known polynomial-time approximation algorithm has linear approximation ratio [EF10] .
In fact, the difference between the Borda rule (and, in general, the positional scoring rules) and the Copeland rule is even more striking. We show that the former can be solved nearly perfectly in polynomial time, whereas for the latter we give strong inapproximability results:
1. Our main contribution is the first polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for SHIFT-BRIBERY for positional scoring rules (Theorem 12). In fact, our algorithm works even for the case where the scoring vectors are different for different voters. Our algorithm uses linear programming and, in particular, basic solutions of linear programs. For the case of unit prices (i.e., for the case where each unit shift has the same cost) we even obtain an EPTAS, i.e., a PTAS for which the non-polynomial factors in the running time depend on the approximation ratio only (Theorem 7). We also show a simple combinatorial PTAS for this case (Theorem 4). 2. For the case of the Copeland rule, we give a reduction that preserves approximation ratios up to some polynomial from the DENSEST k-SUBGRAPH (DkS) problem to SHIFT-BRIBERY (Theorem 14). Since it is generally believed that Densest k-Subgraph is hard to approximate up to a polynomial factor [BCV + 12, Man17], the same beliefs transfer to the case of Copeland-SHIFT-BRIBERY. In particular, this gives an almost-polynomial ratio hardness of approximating Copeland-SHIFT-BRIBERY under the ETH and Gap-ETH assumptions (Corollary 15). We also show that under Gap-ETH, Copeland-SHIFT-BRIBERY does not admit an FPT approximation scheme for the parameterization by the number of unit shifts (Theorem 16) or by the number of affected voters (Theorem 17), even for the case of unit prices. This is in contrast to parameterization by the number of voters or by the number of candidates, for which FPT approximation schemes are known to exist [BCF + 16].
Together with the results of Elkind et al. [EFS09, EF10] and Bredereck et al.
[BCF + 16], our work gives a nearly complete view of the complexity and approximability of SHIFT-BRIBERY for positional scoring rules and the Copeland rule.
Preliminaries
For each positive integer r ∈ N, we write [r] to denote the set {1, . . . , r}, and by [0] we mean the empty set. For an event X, we write 1[X] to denote the indicator function such that 1[X] = 1 if X occurs and 1[X] = 0 otherwise. Given two candidates c, c ′ ∈ C, we write V c≻c ′ to denote the set of all voters v ∈ V that prefer c over c ′ .
Elections. An election E = (C,
Voting Rules. A voting rule R is a function that for each election E = (C, V, {≻ v } v∈V ) outputs the set R(E) ⊆ C of this election's tied winners. We focus on the class of positional scoring rules and on the Copeland rule.
Consider a setting with m candidates. Under a positional scoring rule R w , we have a vector w = (w 1 , . . . , w m ) ∈ R m of point values associated with the candidate positions in the preference orders. Each voter gives each candidate the number of points associated with this candidate's position, and the candidates with the highest total score are the winners. For example, the Plurality rule uses vectors of the form (1, 0, . . . , 0), the k-Approval rule uses vectors with k ones followed by m − k zeros, and the Borda rule uses vectors of the form (m − 1, . . . , 2, 1, 0).
Given an election E = (C, V, {≻ v } v∈V ), we sometimes speak of a positional scoring rule R (w v ) v∈V , where each voter has a separate scoring vector w v = (w v 1 , . . . , w v m ). This is particularly useful, for example, to model weighted elections, where each voter v has a positive integer weight ω v and is treated as ω v copies of a unit-weight voter; then, instead of using some rule R w and incorporating weights directly into our algorithms, we can use rule R (ω v ·w) v∈V . As an added benefit, our algorithms become more general. We will sometimes use ∆w v ℓ as a shorthand for w v ℓ − w v ℓ+1 . The Copeland rule is based on the idea of pairwise elections among the candidates. Let E be an election and let c, c ′ be two candidates. By N E (c, c ′ ) we mean the number of voters who prefer c over c ′ , i.e., |V c≻c ′ |. We say that a candidate c wins pairwise
Similarly, we say that c ties (resp. loses) pairwise election against
For α ∈ [0, 1], the Copeland α rule assigns to each candidate c one point for each candidate with whom c wins a pairwise election, and α points for each candidate with whom c ties. Formally, each candidate c receives |{c ′ ∈ C \ {c} :
The winners are all the candidates with the maximum score.
For a voting rule R, we write sc E,R (c) to denote the score that candidate c receives in election E. We sometimes drop the subscript R when it is clear from the context.
Shift-Bribery. A SHIFT-BRIBERY instance
, a preferred candidate p ∈ C, and a collection ψ = {ψ v } v∈V of the voters' price functions. Each voter v has the price function
specifies the cost of shifting the preferred candidate forward by t positions in v's preference order. We require that ψ v (0) = 0 and that the function is non-decreasing ( 
Let R be a voting rule and let I be a SHIFT-BRIBERY instance with election E and preferred candidate p. Shift action s is successful for I under R if p is an R-winner in shift(E, s), i.e., if p ∈ R(shift(E, s)). R-SHIFT-BRIBERY is an optimization problem where, given a SHIFT-BRIBERY instance I, we ask for a successful shift action with the lowest cost. We write OPT(I) to denote this lowest cost.
Special Price Functions.
There are two particularly interesting families of price functions. A unit price function defines the cost of each unit shift to be one, i.e., if ψ v is a unit price function then ψ v (ℓ) = ℓ for each legal shift value ℓ. An all-or-nothing price function is such that the cost of shifting the preferred candidate is the same, irrespective by how many positions we shift him or her. Formally, if ψ v is an all-or-nothing price function then there is a value c v such that ψ v (ℓ) = c v for all positive integers ℓ that represent legal shifts (and, of course, ψ v (0) = 0). An instance I = (E, p, ψ) has (1, ∞)-all-or-nothing prices if it has all-or-nothing price functions and for each voter v the value c v is in {1, ∞}. Given such an instance I, we define its width to be the maximum
In other words, it is the maximum number of unit shifts possible to perform within a single vote by paying a unit of price. Another family of all-ornothing prices that we will discuss is the family of uniform-all-or-nothing prices, for which c v = 1 for all v ∈ V.
Linear Programming. In the LINEAR PROGRAMMING problem we are given an m × n matrix A, an m-dimensional column vector b, an n-dimensional column vector c, and we ask for an n dimensional column vector x that minimizes the value c T x subject to the condition that Ax b. A basic solution to such a problem is a solution x ∈ R n such that there are n linearly independent rows a i of A with a i x = b i . It is known that when {x ∈ R n : Ax b} is feasible and bounded, there always is a basic solution that achieves the optimum, and it can be computed up to an arbitrary error in polynomial time (see, e.g., [LRS11] for the use of basic solutions in approximation algorithms).
Borda Rule
We now move on to our results. We first show approximation schemes for the case of the Borda rule, mostly focusing on the case of unit prices. We start with Borda because it is one of the simplest rules, for which we can present our ideas most clearly, and because it is a very practical rule (in particular, relevant to various competitions).
Initial Observations
We first define two values that will guide our algorithms, and we explain their usefulness.
Definition 1
For an instance I = (E, p, ψ) of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY and a non-negative integer k, we define:
The former value gives the score difference between the preferred candidate and his or her strongest opponent, whereas the latter measures the total number of points that the non-preferred candidates need to lose, provided that the preferred one gains k points.
Elkind et al. [EFS09] note that given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY, if K is the smallest number of unit shifts in an optimal solution, then max-diff (I)/2 K max-diff (I). Indeed, if the preferred candidate gains max-diff (I) points then he or she certainly matches his or her strongest opponent. On the other hand, the preferred candidate needs at least max-diff (I)/2 unit shifts because each of them decreases the score difference between him or her and the strongest opponent by at most two. However, it turns out that sum-diff (I, k) provides an even more useful bound. Proof. After applying s, the score of p is exactly sc E (p) + k s . Thus each candidate c ∈ C must have lost at least max{0, sc
Lemma 2 Let
This indeed means that
We will also make use of the following subroutine, which is based on a simple dynamic program. (Note that it is not restricted to unit prices.) 
Lemma 3 There exists an algorithm that given an instance
Proof. Let the notation be as in the statement of the lemma, let m be the number of candidates in E, and let V = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) be the collection of voters in E.
We use dynamic programming with table DP of dimension (n + 1) × (nm + 1) × (s 1 + 1) × · · · × (s t + 1). The (i, j, r 1 , . . . , r t )-entry of the table stores the minimum cost of j unit shifts on voters v 1 , . . . , v i that jointly decrease the score of each c i by at least r i points. In the beginning, all the entries are set to ∞, except the (0, 0, . . . , 0)-entry, which is set to zero.
Then we go through i = 1, . . . , n in the increasing order and for every entry of the form (i, j, r 1 , . . . , r t ), we compute its value using the following formula: 
A Combinatorial PTAS for Unit Prices
We now give a simple combinatorial PTAS for Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices. The main idea of our algorithm is as follows. If the optimal number of unit shifts needed is OPT, then, in total, the scores of other candidates decrease by at most OPT. This means that, once we guess OPT correctly, for each ε > 0 there can be at most 1/ε "bad" candidates, whose scores exceed that of the preferred candidate by more than (1 + ε) OPT. Since there are only 1/ε such candidates, we can use the algorithm from Lemma 3 to compute the cheapest set of (at most) OPT unit shifts that ensure that the preferred candidate defeats these candidates. Then, we shift the preferred candidate up further ε OPT times, which ensures that p also defeats all the other candidates. In total, we use only (1 + ε) OPT shifts and hence we arrive at our PTAS for the unit prices case. This idea is formalized below. Proof. Let I = (E, p, ψ) be an instance of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY and let ε > 0 be the desired approximation ratio. For every k between max-diff (I)/2 and max-diff (I), such that sum-diff (I, k) k, we execute the following steps:
} be the set of candidates whose scores are greater than sc E (p) + (1 + ε)k. We use the algorithm from Lemma 3 to find the least-cost shift action that decreases the score of each c ∈ C k BAD by at least sc
If the cost of this shift action is at most k, then we perform additional arbitrary unit shifts so that the total number of unit shifts is ⌊(1 + ε)k⌋ or, if not enough unit shifts are possible, we shift p to the top of every vote. We output all the performed unit shifts and terminate.
We first note that the algorithm indeed outputs a successful shift action. If p ends up being on top of all the votes then he or she clearly wins. On the other hand, if the total number of unit shifts performed is ⌊(1 + ε)k⌋, then the score of p is at least sc E (p) + ⌊(1 + ε)k⌋; this means that, for all the candidates c / ∈ C k BAD , the new score of p is at least sc E (c), which is at least as large as the score of c after the shifts. Moreover, the algorithm from Lemma 3 ensures that after the shifts the score of p is at least as high as the scores of all the candidates from C k BAD . Thus, p is a winner. Next, let us argue that the algorithm computes a (1 + ε)-approximate solution. Recall that due to the results of Elkind et al. [EFS09] , the number of unit shifts in the optimal solution is between max-diff (I)/2 and max-diff (I). Therefore the algorithm must terminate at latest when considering k = OPT(I). Given this many shifts, it is-by definition-possible for p to obtain score higher than all the candidates from C k BAD and, so, the algorithm from Lemma 3 returns a shift action with at most OPT(I) unit shifts. Thus the algorithm terminates with at most ⌊(1 + ε) OPT(I)⌋ unit shifts.
The running time of the algorithm follows from Lemma 3 and is bounded by a polynomial in |I| and Π c∈C k
. However, we only invoke Lemma 3 when k sum-diff (I, k) . This means that:
and we conclude that t(k) < 1/ε. Thus the running time is polynomial with respect to |I| + OPT(I) O(1/ε) .
A Faster FPT Algorithm
Using a very similar reasoning as in Theorem 4, we obtain an FPT algorithm for Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY (with arbitrary price functions) parameterized by the smallest number K of unit shifts in an optimal solution. While this case was already known to be in FPT, our algorithm runs in Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 4, our algorithm tries all the values of k between max-diff (I)/2 and max-diff (I) such that sum-diff E (I, k) k. For such a k it proceeds as follows: (a) It forms the set C k BAD = {c 1 , . . . , c t(k) } of all the candidates whose scores exceed sc E (p) + k and (b) using the algorithm from Lemma 3, it computes the cheapest shift bribery that consists of k unit shifts and ensures that each candidate c in C k BAD loses at least sc E (c) − sc E (p) − k points. If such a shift action exists then it stores it (note that all stored shift actions are successful). The algorithm outputs the cheapest stored shift action.
The correctness of the algorithm follows from the fact that when it considers the value of k = K, then the algorithm from Lemma 3 indeed finds an optimal shift action.
The running time of the algorithm is polynomial in |I| and the values ∏
for the values of k for which Lemma 3 is invoked. When sum-diff E (k) k then the following holds (the first inequality is due to the AM-GM inequality 2 and the last one follows from the Bernoulli's inequality 3 ):
The AM-GM inequality says that for non-negative numbers x 1 , . . . , x n we have 1
Figure 1: Program LP-U(I, k) from the proof of Lemma 6. For each voter v, we have variables
. Constraints (1) ensure that an integral solution describes a valid shift action and Constraints (2) ensure that after applying such an action, each candidate in C k BAD has score no higher than p; recall that V c≻p means the set of voters that prefer c to p. The optimization goal is to minimize the number of unit shifts in the shift action.
Thus the running time of our algorithm is polynomial in |I| and 2 O(K) , which suffices to complete the proof.
EPTAS for Unit Prices
The main result of this subsection is an EPTAS (efficient polynomial-time approximation scheme) for Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, that is, a PTAS for which the non-polynomial factors in the running time depend only on the required approximation ratio. Note that in the algorithm from Theorem 4 this factor was OPT(I) O(1/ε) and, thus, did not depend on ε alone.
On the technical level, we first develop an algorithm that for an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices outputs a solution with cost at most OPT(I) + OPT(I). The general structure of our algorithm is similar to that of the algorithm from Theorem 4, but instead of invoking Lemma 3, we solve a linear program. We form this program in such a way that its basic solution has to consist almost entirely of integral values. Then, rounding and complementing the obtained shift action with arbitrary unit shifts gives the desired solution.
To state our linear program, we will model shift actions as boolean matrices (x (v,j) ) v∈V,j∈ [m] such that x (v,j) is 1 if after applying the shift action the preferred candidate is ranked on position j or better in vote v, and it is 0 otherwise (so we will always have 0
Lemma 6 There is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, outputs a successful shift action with cost at most OPT(I) + OPT(I).
Proof. Let I = (E, p, ψ) be an instance of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, where
. We try all integers k between max-diff (I)/2 and max-diff (I), such that sum-diff (I, k) k, and for each of them we perform the following steps:
1. We form the set C k BAD ⊆ C of those candidates c whose scores exceed value sc
2. We form the linear program LP-U(I, k) from Figure 1 and solve it for a basic solution (note that the objective function gives the number of unit shifts used 
. (Note that the rounded solution indeed correctly describes a shift action and that its cost, i.e., the number of unit shifts it contains, is at most k.) Form a shift action s by extending s LP so that it contains k + ⌊ √ k⌋ unit shifts or, if this is impossible, then so that p is on the top of every preference order. Output s and terminate.
Since finding basic solutions for linear programs can be done in polynomial time, the whole algorithm runs in polynomial time. Further, the cost of the computed shift action s is at most OPT(I) + OPT(I) unit shifts. To see this, consider the step when the algorithm tries k = OPT(I); if it terminates earlier then our claim certainly is satisfied. For this value of k, LP-U(I, k) certainly has a solution of cost at most k because an optimal successful shift action for I is one of its feasible solutions. Thus the algorithm terminates for this value of k and (in Step 3) outputs a shift action with at most OPT(I) + OPT(I) unit shifts.
It remains to show that the computed shift action s is successful. If p ends up at the top of every preference order, then surely s is a successful shift action. Let us consider the case where s consists of exactly k + ⌊ √ k⌋ unit shifts, i.e., where after applying s, p has score sc E (p) + k + ⌊ √ k⌋, for the value of k for which the algorithm terminates. Since prior to applying s each candidate c / ∈ C k BAD had score at most sc E (p) + k + ⌊ √ k⌋, after applying s candidate p certainly has score at least as high as theirs. Thus we only need to show that each candidate in C k BAD also ends up with score at most sc 
Let us say that a voter
Intuitively, each tight inequality of the form (2) can lead to at most a single non-integral voter.
Rounding the basic solution into s LP can increase score difference between c and p by at most 1 for each non-integral voter (score of c is increasing and score of p is decreasing). Hence, in total, after rounding the difference can be at most |V \ V int | ⌊ √ k⌋. More formally, for each c ∈ C k BAD , the score of c after applying s LP is as follows (for a number x, 0 x 1, by frac(x) we mean its fractional part, so that if 0 x < 1 then frac(x) = x and if x = 1 then frac(x) = 0):
This means that p is indeed a winner of the election.
Using this algorithm and the combinatorial PTAS from Theorem 4, we obtain our EPTAS (in short, if max-diff (I) < 2/ε 2 then we run the algorithm from Theorem 4 and we run the algorithm from Lemma 6 otherwise).
Theorem 7
There is an algorithm that, given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices and a positive number ε > 0, runs in time 2 O(log(1/ε)/ε) poly(|I|) and outputs a successful shift action of cost at most (1 + ε) OPT(I).
Proof. Given an instance I of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, our algorithm proceeds as follows: If max-diff (I) < 2/ε 2 then it runs the algorithm from Theorem 4 and, otherwise, if max-diff (I) 2/ε 2 , it runs the algorithm from Lemma 6. Then it returns the output from the respective algorithm.
If max-diff (I) < 2/ε 2 , then OPT(I) < 2/ε 2 , which means that the algorithm from Theorem 4 runs in time OPT(
Since the algorithm from Lemma 6 always runs in time poly(|I|), we conclude that the above algorithm runs in time 2 O(log(1/ε)/ε) poly(|I|).
When we run the algorithm from Theorem 4, the solution is always a (1 + ε)-approximation. On the other hand, when we invoke Lemma 6, we have OPT(I) max-diff (I)/2 1/ε 2 ; hence, the output is of cost at most OPT(I) + OPT(I) = (1 + OPT(I) −0.5 ) OPT(I) (1 + ε) OPT(I). This concludes the proof.
Theorem 7 gives formal evidence that approximating Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY is computationally easier for the case of unit prices than for the general case or, even, for the all-or-nothing prices case. 
Uniform-All-or-Nothing Prices
In addition to the above PTASes, we devise a simple greedy algorithm that yields an asymptotic 1.5-approximation ratio for the special case of uniform-all-or-nothing prices. While this will be subsumed by our PTAS in the next section, the simplicity of the algorithm may make it more practical than the LP-based PTAS in Theorem 12. The main idea of our greedy algorithm is to simply shift the preferred candidate p to the top in the votes where p is ranked lowest. The idea is formalized below.
Theorem 8
There is a greedy algorithm that, given a Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY instance I with uniform-allor-nothing prices, outputs a successful shift action with cost at most (1.5 · OPT(I) + 1) in polynomial time.
Proof. Let I = (E, p, ψ) be an instance of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with uniform-all-or-nothing prices, where E = (C, V, {≻ v } v∈V ). Let m be the number of candidates. Recall that for all-or-nothing prices a solution is simply a set of bribed voters because we can move p to the tops of their preference orders without additional cost.
Our algorithm proceed as follows: As long as p is still not a winner, the algorithm bribes a voter that ranks p on the lowest position. When the lowest position is at least three, ties are broken arbitrarily. However, if the lowest position is two, then the algorithm breaks the ties by choosing the voter whose top-ranked candidate has the highest score.
For each j, let V j ⊆ V denote the set of the voters that rank p on position j. The key observation for the analysis of our algorithm is that to obtain an optimal solution, it suffices to bribe all the voters from V m , then all the voters from V m−1 , and so on, until some value i, such that we only bribe a subset of the voters from V i . We formalize this observation in the following lemma.
Lemma 9 There exists an integer i 2, an optimal solution W for I, and a set of voters
Proof. Let W ′ be some optimal solution for I. As long as W ′ is still not in the required form, we modify W ′ as follows:
1. remove a voter in W ′ that ranks p on the highest position, 2. add a voter from V \ W ′ that ranks p on the lowest position.
Note that in each step of this process the removed voter and the added voter are from different V i 's. Thus in each step we increase the final scores of some candidates by at most 1 (by canceling a shift which decreased their scores) but we also increase the final score of p by at least 1. Hence W ′ remains an optimal solution after each step. It is also easy to see that the process terminates when a solution is in the required form.
Clearly, the greedy algorithm also first bribes all the voters in ( We consider two cases based on the value of i: Case i = 2. In this case the greedy algorithm outputs an optimal solution because it bribes the voters in V 2 in an optimal order (the score of the candidate with the highest score is decreased first, and so on). Case i 3. We claim that in this case the algorithm outputs a solution of cost at most i i−1 OPT(I) + 1; note that this immediately implies the approximation guarantee in Theorem 8. To see this, observe that since W only bribes |W i | voters in E ′ , every candidate c = p has his score decreased by at most |W i | points, whereas the score of our preferred candidate p increases by exactly (i − 1) · |W i | points. Since p wins the election after the voters in W i are bribed, we have sc We conclude this section by remarking that the Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY problem with uniform-allor-nothing prices was not known to be NP-hard before; specifically, Elkind et al. [EFS09] only ,1) , . . . , x (v,m) . For an integral solution, Constraints (3) ensure that the variables specify a shift action, Constraints (4) ensure that this shift action is successful, and the optimization goal specifies its cost.
showed NP-hardness for (1, ∞)-all-or-nothing prices. Nevertheless, it is possible to (carefully) modify the proof to yield NP-hardness for uniform-all-or-nothing prices as well. We provide the full proof in Appendix A.
Positional Scoring Rules
In this section we give our main result: A PTAS for the case of SHIFT-BRIBERY with an arbitrary positional scoring rule, whose scoring vectors are, possibly, different for different voters, and for arbitrary prices. The algorithm and the proof is somewhat involved and we split its description into two parts, by first deriving an algorithm with an additive error and then using it to form the desired PTAS.
An Algorithm with Additive Error
The crucial part of our algorithm is an approximation algorithm that yields a good solution in the case where ψ max (I), the highest non-infinite price in the instance, is small.
The main complication in the general prices case, as opposed to the unit prices case, is that the cost of obtaining some k + 1 points for the preferred candidate can be far larger than the cost of obtaining k points. Thus the main trick used in the proofs from the previous section-deciding up front how many more points than in an optimal solution the preferred candidate would getcannot be directly applied. We work around this problem by first solving a linear program which, roughly speaking, for a given value ε > 0 tells us how many extra points the preferred candidate needs to obtain so that he or she has score higher than all but at most 1 /ε candidates. Then, using a technique similar to the one we used for Lemma 6-in particular, solving a second linear program, for which a basic solution contains a large number of integral variables-we find our approximate solution. Proof. We first describe the somewhat non-intuitive algorithm, then we explain its workings and argue why it produces the desired approximate solution. Let I = (E, p, ψ) be an instance of R-SHIFT-BRIBERY, where E = (C, V) is an election, p is the preferred candidate, and ψ = {ψ v } v∈V(E) is a collection of price functions. Further, let R be a positional scoring rule specified via scoring vectors (w v ) v∈V (with one vector for each voter in V). Our algorithm proceeds as follows:
Lemma 10
Figure 3: LP2 for the proof of Lemma 10. For each voter v, we have variables y (v,1) , . . . , y (v,m) . For an integral solution, Constraints (5) ensure that the variables specify a shift action that pushes p at least as far as shift action s * does, Constraints (6) ensure that p's score at least matches the scores of candidates in C BAD , and Constraint (7) ensures that p's score is higher than the scores of candidates not in C BAD .
1. We solve linear program LP1 from ) v∈V,j∈ [m] be the computed optimal solution found for this program. Note that the value of the optimization goal for LP1 is at most OPT(I), because this would be the cost of an optimal integral solution.
For every
}, and we let j v ∈ [m] be the smallest index such that y * (v,j v ) = 1. Intuitively, the shift action s * that for each voter v shifts p to position j v is our "first order approximation" of the shift action that we will eventually produce; its cost is at most (1 + ε) OPT(I) but after applying it, p's score might still be lower than that of some of the candidates. Formally, we define set C BAD to contain all the candidates c such that:
On the left-hand side of the above equation, candidate c loses as many points as indicated by shift action s * , but the score of p, on the right-hand side, is computed with respect to the possibly fractional values y * (v,j) . 3. We solve linear program LP2 from Figure 3 for an optimal, basic solution (y OPT (v,j) ) v∈V,j∈ [m] . We output shift action s that corresponds to (⌈y OPT (v,j) ⌉) v∈V,j∈ [m] . The algorithm certainly runs in polynomial time. Let us now explain why the shift action that it outputs indeed ensures that p is a winner. Foremost, due to Constraints (5), shift action s (weakly) dominates s * (i.e., for each voter it shifts p at least as far as s * does). Thus, after applying s, each opponent of p who is not in C BAD has score at most as high as in the left-hand side of Equation (8). Constraint (7) ensures that p obtains at least as high a score as on the right-hand side of Equation (8) and, thus, p does not lose against any candidate not in C BAD . On the other hand, Constraints (6) ensure that p does not lose against anyone in C BAD .
It remains to argue that cost I (s) is at most as required in the lemma. To this end, we first claim that |C BAD | < 1/ε.
Proof. Consider any c ∈ C BAD . From the definition of C BAD , we have:
On the other hand, from (4), we have:
.
Subtracting the latter inequality from the former gives:
We lower bound the left-hand side of the above as follows (the inequality follows because we sum fewer non-negative terms, and the equality follows from the fact that for j < j v , we have
):
We upper bound the right-hand side of (9) as follows, by dropping some possibly negative terms and adding some non-negative ones:
Plugging the above two inequalities back to (9), we get:
Summing this over all candidates c ∈ C BAD , we have the following (the final equality follows by replacing the summation over candidates c with a summation over positions j, j < j v where these candidates are ranked):
In the above, the expression on the left-most side is of the form |C BAD | · ε times the expression on the right-most side, so we get |C BAD | < 1/ε, as desired.
We now proceed to bound cost I (s). First, observe that an optimal integral solution for LP1 has cost OPT(I) and, thus, for our optimal, but perhaps non-integral, solution (x (v,j) ) v∈V,j∈ [m] we have:
OPT(I).
For each voter v ∈ V, we say that v is integral if y OPT
the set of all integral voters. Recall that (y OPT (v,j) ) v∈V,j∈ [m] is a basic solution for LP2, meaning that exactly mn linearly independent inequalities must be tight (because we have mn variables). 4 For each non-integral voter v / ∈ V int , only at most m − 1 linearly independent inequalities in (5) are tight. However, there are only 1 + |C BAD | < 1 + 1/ε inequalities of the form (6) and (7). From this, we can conclude that less than 1 + 1/ε voters are not integral, i.e.:
As a result, we have that cost I (s) equals:
Now, observe that the first summation on the right hand side is upper bounded by the optimum of LP2. Note that (y * (v,j) ) v∈V,j∈ [m] is a solution to LP2. Hence, we have:
⌉ is ∞, then OPT(I) must also be ∞ and the inequality we try to prove is trivially true. Hence, we may assume that
⌉ is finite; in this case, this quantity is bounded by ψ max (I). As a result, we can further bound cost I (s) by
(1 + ε) OPT(I) + (1 + 1/ε)ψ max (I), which concludes our proof.
The Final PTAS
Now we use the approximation algorithm with additive error to derive an approximation algorithm with a purely multiplicative ratio. The intuition behind this process is simple: Since the algorithm from Lemma 10 works well when ψ max (I) is small, we will first "preprocess" our instance so that ψ max (I) is much smaller than OPT(I). To do so, note that if we consider an optimal shift action s OPT Proof of Theorem 12. We are given an instance I = (E, p, ψ) of R-SHIFT-BRIBERY, where E = (C, V) is an election, p is the preferred candidate, ψ = {ψ v } v∈V ) is a collection of price functions, and R is a positional scoring rule (possibly with a different scoring vector for each voter in V). We also have ε > 0. Our algorithm works as follows:
1. Let δ = ε 2 /8 and q = ⌈1/δ⌉. 
Observe also that ψ max (I ′ ) b. Thus, Step 2c gives a shift action s * = (s * v ) v∈V such that:
Next, notice that:
and:
Combining (13), (14) and (15), we obtain the following bound on cost I (s * ):
(
Hence, the output shift action has cost at most (1 + ε) OPT(I) as desired.
We remark that as a corollary of Theorem 12, we also get a PTAS for Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY for arbitrary prices.
Copeland
For the case of Copeland α family of rules, we show that the SHIFT-BRIBERY problem is hard to approximate even for the unit prices and for the all-or-nothing prices. Specifically, we show that an approximation algorithm for the Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY implies an approximation algorithm for the DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH problem, which is believed to be hard to approximate [BCV + 12]. Below we describe our results generally, and then we provide their proofs for respective types of price functions in the following sections.
Definition 13 In the DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH (DkS) problem, we are given an undirected graph G = (V G , E G ) and a positive integer k, and the goal is to output a k-vertex subgraph of G with as many edges as possible.

Theorem 14 Let τ be an arbitrary non-decreasing function. If there is a polynomial time τ(|I|)-approximation algorithm for Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY for some α ∈ [0, 1], for the case of unit prices or all-or-nothing prices, then there is a polynomial time O(τ(|V G | O(1) ) 2 )-approximation algorithm for the DkS problem.
Although hardness of approximation of DkS within up to polynomial factor is not known, inapproximability up to almost polynomial factor is known assuming the exponential time hypothesis (ETH) and its gap version (Gap-ETH). 5 Specifically, Manurangsi [Man17] has shown that under the ETH assumption (the Gap-ETH assumption, respectively), DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH is hard to approximate to within a factor of n 1/poly(log log n) (n o(1) , respectively). Together with Theorem 14, this implies the following corollary. For the parameterization by the number of unit shifts, assuming Gap-ETH implies that there is no FPT approximation scheme for the problem even for the case of unit prices.
Theorem 16 Assuming Gap-ETH, for every α ∈ [0, 1], every ε > 0, and every computable function T, there is no algorithm that given a Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY instance I with unit prices, runs in time T(OPT(I)) · poly(|I|) and outputs a successful shift action with at most (2 − ε) OPT(I) unit shifts.
We are not aware of a constant factor FPT approximation algorithms for the problem and it is possible that the factor 2 above can be improved to larger constants, or even beyond a constant. This remains an interesting open question.
Another parameter that has been considered in the literature is the number of affected voters. For this parameter, the exact version is known to be W [2] Notice that the hardness in Theorem 17 is stronger than Theorem 16 both in terms of the approximation ratio and that it requires weaker assumption. We also remark here that, for (1, ∞)-all-ornothing prices, the optimum is exactly equal to the number of affected voters. Hence, the hardness above carries over to the "budget" parameter as well. To summarize, our results implies inapproximability for essentially all parameters left open by [BCF + 16].
Additional Notation and Tools
We need some additional notation in the following text. Let C be a set of candidates. We write C to denote an arbitrary (but fixed) preference order over C, and for each A ⊆ C, by A we mean C restricted to the candidates from A. In Definition 13 we have defined the optimization variant of the DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH problem. In the decision variant, an instance consists of a graph G and two positive integers, k and t, and we ask if it is possible to select k vertices that jointly induce a graph with at least t edges.
Given a graph
we mean the set of edges from E G that have both endpoints in U.
Often, when constructing hard instances for Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY, we want to create additional voters and candidates so that the candidates of our interest have certain scores and certain outcomes of pairwise elections. The following proposition is especially useful for this purpose; it is extracted from the proof of Theorem 4 of [BCF + 16] with slight modifications. We provide a proof for the sake of completeness. 
respectively, where T i = {c i+1 , . . . , c i+(|T|−1)/2 }; here we use the convention that c |T|+j = c j . The key property here is that if there is one voter with a preference order that includes half-seq1(T, c i ) and one with a preference order that includes half-seq2(T, c i ), then c i wins pairwise election against exactly half of the candidates in T \ {c i } (i.e. those in T i ) and ties with the rest. All other pairwise elections not involving c i result in ties.
Let S ⊆ B be any subsets of B of size a. For our election E, we create the following voters:
One voter with preference order
A ∪ B ≻ p ≻ d.
b pairs of voters with preference orders
A ≻ p ≻ B ≻ d and d ≻ ← − B ≻ ←− A ≻ p.
Two voters with preference orders
d ≻ B ≻ A ≻ p and p ≻ ←− A ≻ d ≻ ← − B .
p ≻ B \ S ≻ S ≻ A ≻ d and d ≻ ←− A ≻ ← − S ≻ p ≻ ← −−− − B \ S .
For every candidate c ∈ A ∪ B, two voters with preference orders half-seq1(
A ∪ B, c) ≻ p ≻ d and d ≻ p ≻ half-seq2(A ∪ B,
c).
It is simple to verify that (i) p loses pairwise elections against every candidate in A by 2b + 1 votes, (ii) p wins pairwise elections exactly against the candidates in the set {d} ∪ (B \ S), (iii) d wins pairwise elections exactly with the candidates from B, and (iv) each candidate in A ∪ B wins pairwise elections against exactly half of the other candidates in A ∪ B. These four features of E indeed imply the claimed properties in the statement of the proposition.
All-or-Nothing Prices
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 14 for the case of all-or-nothing prices. To this end, we focus on the next lemma, from which the desired result follows 
(Completeness) If there exists a k-vertex subgraph of G with t edges, then OPT(I) k. 2. (Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δt edges, then OPT(I)
> (k − 1)/ √ δ.
Moreover, the reduction runs in poly(|V G |, t) time.
Proof. Consider an instance (G, k, t) of the decision variant of the DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH problem, where G = (V G , E G ) is a graph and k, t are two integers. Our reduction forms an instance
where D is a set of |E G | + 5 dummy candidates, p is the preferred candidate, and d will be the unique winner of the election prior to shifting p. The voters are constructed as follows (for a vertex u, by Γ G (u) we mean the set of edges incident to it):
1. For each vertex u ∈ V G , we create two voters, v u and v ′ u , such that the preference order of v u is:
and the preference order of v ′ u is its reverse. The cost of each of the possible shifts for v u is one, i.e., ψ v u (1) = · · · = ψ v u (|Γ G (u)|) = 1, whereas the cost of each of the possible shifts for v ′ u is infinity, i.e.,
We invoke Proposition 18 with A = E G , B = D, b = 1 and a = t + 1 and create polynomially many additional voters so that p loses pairwise elections against every candidate in E G by 3 votes, sc
Note that it is possible to obtain these scores via Proposition 18 because for each vertex u, the preference orders of v u and v ′ u cancel each other out. For these voters, let the price of all the possible shifts be infinity.
(Completeness) Suppose that there exists a set U ⊆ V G of k vertices that induces a graph with at least t edges. Consider a shift action where for each u ∈ V we shift p to the first position in the preference order of v u . Clearly, this shift action is of cost k. Moreover, for each edge e = {u 1 , u 2 } ∈ E G [U], the shifts switch the ranks of e and p in two preference orders, those of v u 1 and v u 2 . Since in the original election p was losing the pairwise election against e by 3 votes, after the shifts p wins this pairwise election. As a result, after the shifts the score of p is at least
Hence, p is a winner of the election.
(Soundness) Suppose contrapositively that OPT(I) (k − 1)/ √ δ. Suppose that s = (s v ) v∈V is a successful shift action with cost OPT(I). Since we have all-or-nothing prices, we can assume that for every vote where s shifts p, it shifts him or her to the top position in the vote. Note that no shift action of finite cost can change the score of d. As a result, p must end up having score at least |D|. Observe also that for each vote, no shift action of finite cost can change the relative order of p and any of the candidates in D. This implies that after applying s, p must win pairwise elections against at least t candidates in E G ; let Y ⊆ E G denote the set of these edges. Now, let U ⊆ V denote the set of all u ∈ V G such that at least one unit shift is applied to v u (i.e., s v u > 0). Note that |U| = OPT(I) (k − 1)/ √ δ. Furthermore, it is not hard to see that each edge e = {u 1 , u 2 } ∈ E G loses pairwise election against p if and only if U contains both u 1 and u 2 . In other words, we have
The expected number of edges induced by U ′ is:
As a result, there exists a k-vertex subgraph of G with δt edges, which concludes our proof.
Unit Prices
The unit prices part of Theorem 14 is established via a reduction from the all-or-nothing price case; we state the reduction in the general form below as it will be used again in the next section. Proof. Let the notation be as in the statement of the theorem and let E = (C, V, {≻ v } v∈V ) be the election from instance I. We assume without loss of generality that |V| 3. We form an election 
Lemma 20
In other words, we add the filler candidates from D v right in front of p, and we put the rest of the filler candidates at the end of the list. Note that each filler candidate from D loses pairwise election to each candidate from C. We form an instance I ′ = (E ′ , p, ψ ′ ), where ψ ′ are unit prices.
It is not hard to check that if a shift action s ∈ N V 0 is successful for I, then the shift action s ′ ∈ N V 0 defined by:
is successful for I ′ . Moreover, since I uses (1, ∞)-all-or-nothing price functions of width b, the cost incurred by s ′ for each voter is at most (B + b) times the original cost of that voter in s. As a result, we have OPT(I ′ ) (B + b) · OPT(I) as desired.
Next, we show that OPT(I ′ ) min{B · OPT(I), B ′ }. Suppose that OPT(I ′ ) < B ′ ; we will show that OPT(I ′ ) B · OPT(I). Consider any shift action s ′ ∈ N V 0 with cost OPT(I ′ ) (with respect to the instance I ′ ) that is successful for I ′ . We define s ∈ N V 0 by:
It is simple to see that s is successful for I. Moreover, since OPT(I ′ ) < B ′ and for each voter v ∈ V such that the cost of shifting p in v is ∞ (in terms of the instance I) we have that |D v ′ | = B ′ , we see that s does not contain infinity-priced shifts (in terms of I). Finally, for every voter v such that
This means that the cost of s (in terms of I) is at most OPT(I ′ )/B. Hence, B · OPT(I) OPT(I ′ ) as desired.
Lastly, suppose that B > b · OPT(I). Consider any minimum cost successful shift action s ′ of I ′ ; we might assume without loss of generality that s ′ v is either zero or at least B.
we can change s ′ v to zero, which retains p as a winner and also reduces the cost. From this, we have that the number of affected voters in s ′ is at most
In other words, s ′ affects at most OPT(I) voters, which concludes our proof.
We can now prove the desired inapproximability of Copeland α for unit prices, by simply applying Lemmas 19 and 20 together with appropriate values of B and B ′ . This idea is formalized below.
Lemma 21
For each α ∈ [0, 1], there exists a reduction that takes in a DENSEST-k-SUBGRAPH instance (G, k, t) and outputs an instance I ′ of Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices such that the following holds for every 0 < δ 1 (V G is the set of vertices for G):
(Completeness) If there exists a k-vertex subgraph of G with t edges, then OPT(I
′ ) 2|V G | · k. 2
. (Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δt edges, then OPT(I
Moreover, the reduction runs in poly(|V G |, t) time.
Proof. Let (G, k, t) be our input instance of DkS, where 
(The last inequality holds because we can assume w.l.o.g. that δ 1/t and that t k 2 |V G | 2 .)
FPT Inapproximability Results
In this section we show that approximating Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY is difficult even for FPT algorithms, for the parameterizations by the number of unit shifts and by the number of affected voters.
Parameterization by the Number of Unit Shifts
We first show FPT inapproximability of Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY with unit prices, parameterized by the number of unit shifts (Theorem 16). To do so, let us recall the following hardness result regarding distinguishing a graph with a k-clique and one in which every k-vertex subgraph is sparse, as proved by Chalermsook et al. [CCK + 17] (which, in turn, relies heavily on the reduction and the main lemma of Manurangsi [Man17] ). 
(Soundness) If every k-vertex subgraph of G contains fewer than δ(
Before we proceed, we note that the reduction from the previous section does not work in the parameterized context. The reason is that the optimum there depends on |V G |, whereas here we would like the optimum to be bounded from above by some function of k. Instead, we turn to the reduction used by Bredereck et al. 
Proof. Our input consists of graph G = (V G , E G ) and positive integer k. We create an instance
is an election, p is the preferred candidate, and ψ = (ψ v ) v∈V is a collection of price functions. We let C = V G ∪ D ∪ {p, d}, where D consists of additional |V G | + 5 dummy candidates and d is a candidate who will be a winner in E (prior to shifting p). We form the voter collection, together with their preference orders and price functions, as follows:
1. For each edge e = {u 1 , u 2 } ∈ E G , we create two voters, v e and v ′ e , such that the preference order of v e is:
and the preference order of v ′ e is the reverse of that of v e . The cost of the two possible shifts for v e are ones, i.e., ψ v e (1) = ψ v e (2) = 1, whereas the cost of all possible shifts for v ′ e are infinity, i.e., ψ v ′ e (1) = · · · = ψ v ′ e (|C| − 3) = ∞. 
We invoke Proposition 18 with
Note that we can use Proposition 18 to obtain these scores because for each edge e, the preference orders of v e and v ′ e cancel each other out. For all these voters, let the price of all possible shifts be infinity.
(Completeness) Suppose that there exists a set U ⊆ V G of k vertices that induces a k-clique. Consider a shift action where for each edge e ∈ E G [U], we shift p to the first position in the preference order of v e . Clearly, this solution is of cost ( k 2 ). Moreover, for each vertex u ∈ U, the shifts switch the ranks of u and p in the preference orders of (k − 1) voters corresponding to all the edges incident to u. Since in the original election p was losing the pairwise election against u by 2k − 3 voters, p wins the pairwise election against u after the shifts. As a result, after the shifts the score of p is at least |D| − k + |U| = |D|, which is at least as high as the score of d (note that our shifts did not change d's score). Hence, p is a winner of the election.
(Soundness) Suppose contrapositively that OPT(I) (2 − δ)( k 2 ). Suppose that s = (s v ) v∈V is a successful shift action with cost OPT(I). Since we have all-or-nothing prices, we can assume that for every vote where s shifts p, it shifts him or her to the top position in the vote. Note that no shift action of finite cost can change the score of d. As a result, p must end up having score at least |D|. Observe also that no shift action of finite cost affects the relative order of p and any candidate from D. This implies that, after applying s, p must win pairwise elections against at least k candidates in V G ; let U ⊆ V G denote the set of k candidates that p ends up wining pairwise elections against.
(If p wins against more than k such candidates in V G then pick k of them arbitrarily.) Now, let E * ⊆ E G denote the set of all edges e ∈ E G such that at least one unit shift is applied to v e (i.e., s v e > 0). Note that |E * | = OPT(I) (2 − δ)( k 2 ). Now, let us consider each vertex candidate v ∈ U. Since p loses pairwise election against u by 2k − 3 votes in E, but ends up winning the pairwise election after applying s, it must be that applying s puts p ahead of u in at least k − 1 preference orders. More formally, this means that:
Summing the above inequality over all u ∈ U gives:
. That is, the subgraph of G induced by U is a k-vertex subgraph with at least δ( 
This completes the proof.
Parameterization by the Number of Affected Voters
We now move on to the parameterization by the number of affected voters (Theorem 17). Our result will rely on the recent parameterized hardness of approximation result for Set Cover, due to Chen and Lin [CL16] . Before we state their result, let us briefly recall the (Minimum) Set Cover problem. An instance (U, S) of Set Cover consists of the universe U = {u 1 , . . . , u N } and a collection S = {S 1 , . . . , S M } of subsets of U. The goal is to find a subcollection S ′ ⊆ S of smallest size such that We note that the above result has been qualitatively strengthened by Karthik et al. [CLM18] . Indeed, if we were interested in getting a super-constant hardness of approximation result, or a tight running-time lower bound, the latter would give a better result. However, we choose to state our hardness as simply as possible (i.e., as Theorem 17) and, hence, it suffices to start from the result of Chen and Lin [CL16] .
Similarly to our previous results, we prove Theorem 17 in two steps. First, by reducing Set Cover to Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1, ∞)-all-or-nothing prices, as stated below, and then by using Lemma 20.
Lemma 26 There is a polynomial time reduction that takes as input an instanceĨ = (U, S) of Set Cover and produces an instance I of Copeland
α -SHIFT-BRIBERY with (1, ∞)-all-or-nothing prices such that OPT(I) = OPT(Ĩ).
Note that the above lemma, together with Theorem 25, immediately yields hardness in Theorem 17 for (1, ∞)-all-or-nothing prices. The proof of Lemma 26 is similar to the previous proofs except that now (some) voters correspond to the subsets and (some) candidates correspond to the elements of the universe; this can be seen as a modification of the W 
Note that we can use Proposition 18 to obtain these scores because for each S ∈ S, the preference orders of v S and v ′ S cancel each other out. For all these voters, let the price of all possible shifts be infinity.
Clearly the reduction runs in polynomial time. We next argue that OPT(I) = OPT(Ĩ).
To do so, let us first argue that OPT(I) OPT(Ĩ). Let S ′ ⊆ S be such that |S ′ | = OPT(Ĩ) and
Consider a shift action that shifts p to the first position in the preference order of v S for all S ∈ S ′ . This shift action is of cost OPT(Ĩ). Moreover, since S∈S ′ S = U, this shift action switches the rank of p and u in at least one voter for each u ∈ U. Since p was losing the pairwise election against u by one vote, p wins the pairwise election after the shifts. Hence, the score of p after the shifts become |D| − N + N = |D|, which is at least as high as the score of d (note that our shifts did not change d's score). Hence, p is a winner of the election after the shifts, which implies that OPT(I) OPT(Ĩ) as desired.
Finally, we argue that OPT(I) OPT(Ĩ). Suppose that s = (s v ) v∈V is a successful shift action with cost OPT(I). Since we have all-or-nothing prices, we can assume that for every vote where s shifts p, it shifts him or her to the top position in the vote. Note that no shift action of finite cost can change the score of d. As a result, p must end up having score at least |D|. Observe also that no shift action of finite cost affects the relative order of p and any candidate from D. This implies that, after applying s, p must win pairwise elections against all n candidates in U. Let S ′ denote the collection of all subsets S such that at least one unit shift is applied to v S (i.e. s v S > 0). Consider any element u ∈ U. Since p loses the pairwise election against u in the original election but wins after the shifts, it must be that the shifts switch the order of p and u in at least one voter. This is equivalent to: u ∈ S for some S ∈ S ′ . In other words, we have S∈S ′ S = U, which implies that OPT(Ĩ) |S ′ | = OPT(I) as desired. We remark that Lemma 27 immediately implies the hardness for unit prices stated in Theorem 17. This is because (i) implies that the reduction is FPT (i.e. the parameter in the new problem is no more than the previous parameter), and (ii) implies that, for any constant τ, a τ-approximation for OPT(I ′ ) would give a (2τ)-approximation for OPT(Ĩ); the latter is W[1]-hard (Theorem 25).
Proof of Lemma 27. Let an instanceĨ = (U, S) of Set Cover be our input. We first apply Lemma 26 to produce an instance I = (E, 
Conclusions
We have given the first PTAS for SHIFT-BRIBERY for the case of positional scoring rules, and we have shown severe limitations regarding approximability of Copeland α -SHIFT-BRIBERY. We have also shown more efficient versions of our algorithms for the case of the Borda rule with unit prices. Our PTAS improves upon the 2-approximation algorithm of Elkind et al. [EFS09, EF10] , but their algorithm is quite robust and was used, e.g., for combinatorial shift bribery [BFNT16] and bribery in approval elections [FST17] . It may be possible to apply our technique in these settings as well.
Another interesting direction is to see whether our ideas can be applied to the BRIBERY problem, where the goal is to minimize the number of bribed voters but we are allowed to change each bribed voter's preference arbitrarily. On this front, Keller et al. [KHH18] give a PTAS for the problem for Borda, t-approval, and, more generally, any scoring rule that satisfies a certain technical condition. It remains open whether a PTAS exists for all scoring rules.
A NP-hardness of Uniform-All-or-Nothing Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY Elkind, Faliszewski and Slinko [EFS09] showed NP-hardness of Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY using (1, ∞)-all-or-nothing prices, whereas Bredereck et al. [BCF + 16] adapted their proof to the case of unit prices. In this section we show that NP-hardness holds already for uniform-all-or-nothing prices.
Our reduction is similar in spirit to the one used by Elkind et al. [EFS09] , but to avoid using ∞-prices, we have to provide some more structure. To this end, we reduce from the CUBIC VERTEX COVER problem, that is, from the VERTEX COVER problem on 3-regular graphs; it is well known that CUBIC VERTEX COVER remains NP-hard [GJS76, FHJ98] . Formally, in CUBIC VERTEX COVER we are given a graph G = (V G , E G ), where each vertex has degree exactly three, and a positive integer k. We ask if there is a subset A ⊆ V G of at most k vertices such that each edge is incident to at least one vertex from A.
The idea of the reduction is to introduce n G = |V G | pairs of voters that represent the vertices of G, and m G = |E G | candidates that represent the edges of G. We interpret bribing a voter (and shifting the preferred candidate to the top position in his or her preference order) as including a given vertex in the cover. Consequently, shifting a given candidate from E G back (by one position) is interpreted as covering the corresponding edge. The constructed instance of uniform-all-ornothing Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY is a yes-instance if and only if all the candidates E G can be shifted down by at least one position within the given budget. There are also additional voters that are formed in such a way that bribing them is never beneficial (p is high in their rankings), but they increase the scores of the candidates from E G so that they have more points than p. There are also additional dummy candidates that are responsible for fixing the relative scores of our main candidates.
Theorem 28 Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY with uniform-all-or-nothing prices in NP-hard.
Proof. Recall that B denotes an arbitrary (but fixed) preference order over subset of candidates B and ← − B denotes the reverse of the order B .
Let (G, k) be an instance of CUBIC VERTEX COVER, let n G = |V G |, and let m G = |E G |. Note that m G = 3 2 n G (because the graph is 3-regular) and k < n G (otherwise we have a trivial yesinstance; we also assume that k 3). We construct an instance (E, p, k) of the decision version of the uniform-all-or-nothing Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY as follows. We let the candidate set be C = {p} ∪ E G ∪ D, where D is a set of 3n G − 1 dummy candidates. We write t to denote the highestranked dummy candidate in the order D . Below we describe our collection of voters:
1. For each u ∈ V G , we introduce two voters, v u and v ′ u , with the following preference orders (a, b, c ∈ E G are the edges incident to u):
2. Let L = n G + 2k − 5. For each i ∈ [L], we introduce two voters, v E i and v E ′ i , with the following preference orders:
The inequalities in the last two items hold because we assumed that n G > k 3. It shows that p has at least as many points as the other candidates hence p is a winner.
(⇐) Next, we show that if (E, p, k) is a yes-instance of uniform-all-or-nothing Borda-SHIFT-BRIBERY, then (G, k) is a yes-instance of CUBIC VERTEX COVER. Let V A be a set of k voters such that if we push p to be ranked first by each of them, then p becomes a winner of the election. After bribing k voters, the score of p increases at most by k(|D| + 3) (this happens if we bribe voters of the form v u , v ′ u , for u ∈ V G ; all the other voters rank p higher and, thus, bribing them gives lower score increase for p). Thus, after bribing k voters the score of p is at most (by e we mean an arbitrary edge candidate; all these candidates have identical scores):
If V A contained at least one voter from the second or the third group, the score of p would be too low. Hence, V A contains voters from the first group only, and for each e ∈ E G , V A must contain a voter that ranks p below e. However, this means that the voters in V A must correspond to a vertex cover for G of size at most k (V A may contain a pair of voters v u , v ′ u ).
The above proof gives some flexibility in fixing the scores of p and the edge candidates. Using this flexibility, one might be able to obtain NP-hardness results for scoring rules similar to Borda (e.g., scoring rules that give some additional advantage for being ranked first, such as those used in Formula 1 racing).
